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NOTES
CIVIL COMMITMENT AND THE RIGHT TO TREATMENT
Plaintiff, Kenneth Donaldson, brought a civil rights action' for
damages' against certain administrators and staff of the state mental
institution to which he had been confined for over fourteen years.
Diagnosed a paranoid schizophrenic, Donaldson had originally been
committed on the petition of his father, and during his confinement
received no appreciable psychiatric care. After instruction that the
plaintiff had a constitutional right to receive treatment, the jury
returned a verdict against two of the defendants.3 Affirming the judg-
ment of the district court, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that a non-dangerous patient who is involuntarily civilly committed
to a state mental hospital has "a constitutional right to such treat-
ment as will help him to be cured or to improve his mental condi-
tion."' Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1974), cert.
granted, 95 S.Ct. 171 (1974).
Because commitment drastically restricts personal liberty, both
procedural and substantive due process considerations are appropri-
ate in determining what right a civilly committed mental patient has
to treatment.5 Commitment procedures, particularly those providing
for confinement of persons who are either mentally incompetent to
stand trial or acquitted by reason of insanity, are sometimes sum-
mary and do not provide the safeguards' traditionally associated with
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
2. Plaintiff originally filed a class action seeking injunctive and habeas corpus
relief as well as damages. After filing suit, Donaldson was released. The district court
dismissed the class action and considered the prayer for damages only. Donaldson v.
O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 512-13 (5th Cir. 1974).
3. The jury awarded $28,500 in compensatory damages and $10,000 in punitive
damages against the defendants, Dr. J.B. O'Connor and Dr. John Gumanis. O'Connor
was Donaldson's attending physician from the time of his admission in 1957 until mid-
1959. Thereafter, he served as Clinical Director and Superintendent of the hospital
until his retirement in 1971. Gumanis was Donaldson's attending physician from 1959
through the early part of 1967. Id. at 510.
4. Id. at 527.
5. The right to treatment is not construed as a right or guarantee of cure. It is
the right to receive such "treatment as will give each ... [patient] a realistic oppor-
tunity to be cured or to improve his or her mental condition." Wyatt v. Stickney, 325
F. Supp. 781, 784 (M.D. Ala. 1971) (emphasis added).
6. Several important procedural due process rights are vouchsafed by Louisiana's
provisions for commitment of those lacking mental capacity to stand trial. LA. CODE
CraM. P. arts. 641-49. Procedural guarantees are less apparent under the statutes
authorizing commitment of defendants acquitted because of insanity. Id. arts. 650-58.
Although these statutes are found in the Code of Criminal Procedure, the incompetent
in either case has not been convicted of a crime, and his commitment is essentially
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"fundamental fairness."7 Judicial acquiesence to these procedures
appears, in some instances, to be conditioned upon sufficient provi-
sion for treatment.' Thus, the patient denied treatment after commit-
ment by summary proceedings should have a judicially enforcible
right to obtain the treatment promised or to be released.'
A strong substantive due process argument may also be made in
support of the right to treatment. Government regulations signifi-
cantly abridging the fundamental right of personal liberty must be
justified by a compelling state interest, and must incorporate the
"least restrictive" of available alternatives in order to lessen the in-
fringement.10 States have traditionally offered two justifications for
civil. The Code articles may be the basis for urging recognition of a statutory right to
treatment, since in each case the authorized commitment is described as embracing
"custody, care and treatment." Id. arts. 648, 654 (emphasis added).
Louisiana's Mental Health Law, LA. R.S. 28:1-205 (1950), details. commitment
procedures which seem essentially consonant with fundamental fairness. Although
coroner's commitment, authorized by R.S. 28:52, dispenses with most safeguards, it
is probably not defective since maximum confinement under that provision is 60 days.
Judicial commitment, sanctioned by R.S. 28:53, affords the patient notice, hearing,
and right to counsel-at state expense if necessary. Furthermore, such confinement is
predicated on a finding that "the patient is suffering from a mental illness which
causes him to be dangerous to himself or to others and/or incapable of caring for
himself or his personal safety." LA. R.S. 28:53 (Supp. 1973). The statutory language
can legitimately be construed to grant to patients a statutory right to treatment, since
LA. R.S. 28:50 (Supp. 1968), governing all civil commitments under Title 28, states
that patients shall be received "for observation, diagnosis, care and treatment." (Em-
phasis added.)
7. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1957), it has been suggested, indicates a willingness on
the part of the Court to impose at least some procedural due process requirements upon
essentially civil proceedings. But the extent to which procedural safeguards may be
attached to civil commitment proceedings is unresolved. See Comment, 77 YALE L.J.
87 (1967).
8. Some courts have validated procedurally deficient commitments when treat-
ment was the quid pro quo for procedural rights withheld. See Miller v. Overholser,
206 F.2d 415 (D.C. Cir. 1953); Commonwealth v. Hogan, 341 Mass. 372, 170 N.E.2d
327 (1960). In other cases, the courts have refused to validate deficient procedures
because treatment was not provided. See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972);
Darnell v. Cameron, 348 F.2d 64 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Dixon v. Attorney General, 325 F.
Supp. 966 (M.D. Pa. 1971).
9. If the state chooses, through its legislature, not to provide sufficient funds for
facilities and staff adequate to discharge the state's obligation to its mental patients,
then the court is compelled to prohibit the state from further confining them. See, e.g.,
Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451, 457-58 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Welsch v. Likins, 373 F.
Supp. 487, 497-99 (D. Minn. 1974); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373, 378 (M.D.
Ala. 1972), aff'd sub nom., Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974); Birnbaum,
The Right to Treatment, 46 A.B.A.J. 499 (1960).
10. For a discussion of the applicability of strict judicial scrutiny of statutes
depriving liberty by long term commitment, and of the constitutional necessity of
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the commitment of the mentally ill." First, commitment is claimed
to be a proper exercise of the state's police power, necessary to protect
society from dangerous mental defectives and to protect the incompe-
tent from either self-inflicted harm or a hostile environment." Sec-
ond, the theory of parens patriae supports confinement as providing
an opportunity to improve the incompetent's condition so that he
may return to society. Although the degree of state interest under the
police power rationale appears compelling, confinement with ade-
quate treatment is "less restrictive" than confinement without treat-
ment, and thus seems constitutionally required. Finding a compelling
state interest for confinement without treatment is more difficult
under the parens patriae rationale, when society's interest is theoreti-
cally beneficent rather than self-protective. Since the confinement is
ostensibly for the purpose of care and treatment, the theory is under-
mined by a failure to treat adequately. Consequently, under either
justification, substantive due process would seem to prohibit com-
mitment without provision of adequate treatment, and several courts
have so held.' 3
A persuasive eighth amendment argument has also been made
in support of a right to treatment. The cruel and unusual punishment
clause was interpreted in Robinson v. California" as barring penal
incarceration for mere status. The civilly committed are not con-
victed criminals; they are mental incompetents institutionalized be-
applying less restrictive alternatives wherever possible, see Chambers, Alternatives to
Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Practical Guides and Constitutional
Imperatives, 70 MICH. L. REv. 1107 (1972). See generally Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S.
330, 343 (1972); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
11. See Note, 53 VA. L. REv. 1134 (1967). A third justification, that of relieving
the families of the confined of the burden of caring for him, was emphatically rejected
by the Fifth Circuit in Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
12. Bazelon, Implementing the Right to Treatment, 36 U. CHI. L. REv. 742, 748-
49 (1969).
13. See Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487 (D. Minn. 1974); Stachulak v. Cough-
lin, 364 F. Supp. 686 (N.D. Ill. 1973); Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala.
1971), aff'd sub nom., Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974). The courts in
these cases seem to predicate their finding of a constitutional right to treatment on
both due process and eighth amendment grounds. There is also authority for the
proposition that no constitutional right to treatment exists in favor of involuntarily
committed mental patients. See Burnham v. Department of Public Health, 349 F.
Supp. 1335 (N.D. Ga. 1972), rev'd and remanded, 503 F.2d 1319 (5th Cir. 1974).
Burnham was reversed on the strength of the instant case, and final disposition will
probably await the forthcoming United States Supreme Court decision. For other
authority denying a constitutional right to treatment, see New York State Ass'n for
Retarded Children v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752 (E.D.N.Y. 1973). See also Katz,
The Right to Treatment-An Enchanting Legal Fiction?, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 755 (1969).
14. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
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cause of their status. Since confinement without treatment may be
considered equivalent to penal incarceration, the institutionalization
of the mentally ill without actual treatment has been found to violate
the eighth amendment."9
Whether the right to treatment is derived from the Constitution,
or from a particular statute,"6 the cases recognizing a right to treat-
ment indicate several remedies available for its enforcement. The
right has been asserted in habeas corpus proceedings, where the
state's failure to provide adequate treatment was deemed sufficient
ground for relief.'7 Lack of treatment may also give rise to an action
for damages, either under the civil rights statutes, if the right is found
to be federal, 18 or in tort for false imprisonment or malpractice.' 9 In
actions for declaratory and injunctive relief, continued confinement
without treatment has been enjoined, and the right to treatment
affirmatively recognized.2"
The jurisprudence also suggests several standards by which the
adequacy of treatment might be judged. One approach is to review,
with the assistance of expert witnesses, the individual treatment
given the complaining patient"-an inquiry not unlike that tradition-
15. See Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487 (D. Minn. 1974); Stachulak v. Cough-
lin, 364 F. Supp. 686 (N.D. Ill. 1973); Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala.
1971), aff'd sub noam., Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974). See also Rouse
v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966); United States v. Pardue, 354 F. Supp. 1377
(D. Conn. 1973).
16. The existence of a right to treatment was given statutory rather than constitu-
tional foundation by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. In re Curry,
452 F.2d 1360 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Dobson v. Cameron, 383 F.2d 519 (D.C. Cir. 1967);
Tribby v. Cameron, 379 F.2d 104 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451,
453 (D.C. Cir. 1966). Not all courts have made the source of the right clear. Nason v.
Superintendent of Bridgewater State Hosp., 353 Mass. 604, 613, 233 N.E.2d 908, 914
(1968).
17. See, e.g., Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Stachulak v.
Coughlin, 364 F. Supp. 686 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). For a discussion of several recent cases where a right
to treatment was asserted under § 1983, see Note, 27 OKLA. L. Rlv. 238 (1974). But
see Collins v. Bensinger, 374 F. Supp. 273 (N.D. Ill. 1974) (court refused to apply right
to treatment retroactively under § 1983 to permit money damages, reasoning that state
should not be held to anticipate future course of constitutional law).
19. E.g., Whitree v. State, 290 N.Y.S.2d 486, 502 (C.C.N.Y. 1968). Cf. Burnham
v. Department of Public Health, 349 F. Supp. 1335 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
20. See, e.g., Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir. 1974); Welsch v. Likins, 373
F. Supp. 487 (D. Minn. 1974); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972),
aff'd sub nom., Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
21. See, e.g., Dobson v. Cameron, 383 F.2d 519 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Tribby v. Cam-
eron, 379 F.2d 104 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala.
1971). Cf. Bazelon, Implementing the Right to Treatment, 36 U. Cm. L. REV. 742
(1969).
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ally made in malpractice suits and involving many of the same evi-
dentiary problems. A court using this method is not required to iden-
tify the best treatment or to discriminate between equally acceptable
medical judgments, but need only determine whether the provided
treatment falls within a broad range of medically permissible alterna-
tives. By employing an individual standard of review, the court is
best able to insure that each patient will not be denied his constitu-
tional right to treatment. However, such review is cumbersome, ex-
pensive, time consuming, and cannot reasonably be applied when the
claim is made in behalf of a class.
To avoid the practical disadvantages inherent in individualized
review, several courts have chosen to gauge the adequacy of treat-
ment by a general evaluation of the institution involved. 2 The phys-
ical plant, the size and quality of the staff, the level of care normally
tendered, and the comprehensiveness of treatment procedures and
scheduling become the criteria for judging the sufficiency of treat-
ment. An institutional standard of review is objective, judicially
manageable, and appropriate for assessment of class claims. Further-
more, where the adequacy of whole institutions is examined, the level
of care is likely to improve for all patients, not just for those asserting
their rights. The effect of institution-wide review, however, might
well be to foreclose a badly treated patient's remedy because the
institution generally furnishes adequate treatment.
As another alternative, some judges and commentators have pro-
posed evaluation of treatment by a panel of mental health experts. 21
Such a panel could operate as an administrative court, either dispos-
ing of right to treatment claims with its decisions subject to court
review, or screening complaints and referring meritorious ones to the
courts. However, broad use of court-created panels in an administra-
tive rather than advisory capacity might well raise questions concern-
ing the scope of judicial authority, and would invite accusations of
"judicial legislation." Even if courts are unwilling to create their own
expert panels, their continued insistence on recognition of a consti-
22. E.g., Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1971). Note particularly
the appendix beginning at 379, entitled "Minimum Constitutional Standards for Ade-
quate Treatment of the Mentally Ill." See also Birnbaum, A Rationale for The Right,
57 GEo. L. REv. 752 (1969).
23. See Dobson v. Cameron, 383 F.2d 519, 521-23 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (Danaher, J.,
concurring). The court also used a committee to review treatment within the institu-
tion and to advise patients of their constitutional rights in Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F.
Supp. 373, 376-88 (M.D. Ala. 1972), but declined to establish a panel of experts to
administer the institution, preferring to keep the court from perpetual involvement if
possible. See also Bazelon, Implementing the Right to Treatment, 36 U. CHI. L. REv.
742 (1969).
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tutional right to treatment might well prompt Congress or state legis-
latures to initiate an administrative procedure. 4 Regardless of the
procedure selected, some judges, questioning a court's competency to
make essentially medical determinations, would prefer that judicial
review of the adequacy of treatment be extremely limited 5 or pre-
cluded altogether. 8
The instant case is the first federal court of appeal decision to
consider whether a constitutional right to treatment exists. 7 In hold-
ing that the right exists for the non-dangerous involuntarily civilly
committed, the court relies heavily upon the substantive due process
argument.28 Commitment under a parens patriae rationale requires
that treatment be afforded, "lest the involuntary commitment
amount to an arbitrary exercise of government[al] power proscribed
by the due process clause."2 The court strengthens its holding with
what appears to be a procedural due process analysis," observing that
long term incarceration is generally proscribed by due process unless
the person has been found guilty of a specifically defined offense.
Furthermore, the detention is "usually allowed only for a period of
time explicitly fixed. ... 1 When these limitations on the govern-
ment's power to detain are absent, there must be a quid pro quo, and
the most commonly asserted quid pro quo is treatment.
While Donaldson adds to the growing body of law which declares
that the mentally ill have a cognizable right to adequate treatment,
24. Under such a system, the burden of proof could be shifted to the defendant
(when the state is a party to the action), so that the plaintiff would not be forced to
establish the inadequacy of treatment. The panel might also police the institutions,
setting and enforcing appropriate standards of care.
25. See then Judge Burger's dissenting opinion in Dobson v. Cameron, 383 F.2d
519, 523-24 (D.C. Cir. 1967). He would preclude court scrutiny in most cases by apply-
ing a presumption that where any treatment is given, it is deemed adequate. However,
given that the right is constitutional, rather than statutory as in Dobson, the imposi-
tion of such a presumption raises substantive due process questions.
26. Dicta in Burnham suggests that evaluation of the adequacy of treatment is
beyond the competence of the courts. Burnham v. Department of Public Health, 349
F. Supp. 1335, 1341-43 (N.D. Ga. 1972), rev'd, 503 F.2d 1319 (5th Cir. 1974).
27. Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 519 (5th Cir. 1974).
28. Id. at 520-21.
29. Id. at 521.
30. The Fifth Circuit indicates that its quid pro quo argument differs significantly
from the due process analysis which views treatment as the exchange for surrender of
procedural safeguards and suggests that its view should be contrasted with it. Never-
theless, the court's conclusion that a quid pro quo must be "extended by the govern-
ment to justify confinement" imposed where the term is not fixed, the offense is not
specified, and "fundamental procedural safeguards" are not observed, seems to differ
little from the rationale they purport to reject. Id. at 522 & n.21.
31. Id. at 522.
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the decision does not purport to solve all the problems implicit in the
recognition of the right. The factual context of the case precluded the
question of whether lack of institutional funds can constitute a good
defense to a suit for damages brought personally against administra-
tors and staff.32 The particularized standard of review used by the
court 3 and the remedy ordered" flowed from the nature of Donald-
son's claim and are not an indication that other standards or reme-
dies are not equally appropriate. The court did, however, specifically
reject the notion that evaluation of the adequacy of treatment is
beyond the competency of the court.3 5
The holding in Donaldson conforms precisely to the facts of the
case; the constitutional right to treatment is extended only to non-
dangerous involuntarily civilly committed mental patients. Indeed,
the court by-passed a strong eighth amendment argument supporting
the right, possibly because it does not readily limit itself to non-
dangerous patients. Nevertheless, the court's reasoning invites a
wider application of the right. Civil commitment is no less a massive
curtailment of liberty for the dangerous patient than for the non-
dangerous one. Thus, even if the state's police power is used to justify
confinement of a dangerous patient, substantive due process may
require treatment to afford a less restrictive infringement upon per-
sonal liberty. Moreover, the Fifth Circuit's procedural due process
requirement of a quid pro quo for a patient who is denied the "con-
ventional limitations of the criminal process" seems to apply equally
to dangerous and non-dangerous confinees. Assuming treatment is
the quid pro quo, the implication seems to be that the dangerous
patient who is civilly committed has a right to treatment unless he
has been granted the full panoply of rights accorded a defendant in
criminal proceedings.
David Stuart Kelly
32. The court agreed with the jury determination that the defendants "failed to
take steps that would have been open to them to take, even given the admittedly stark
limitations on resources available to them." Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 518
(5th Cir. 1974). Since the defendants lacked good faith, they were held personally liable
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). The "limited resources" defense might have worked
had the defendants been in good faith, though the issue is not discussed in the opinion.
Cf. Collins v. Bensinger, 374 F. Supp. 273 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
33. That the right is to individual treatment is significant, but does not compel a
particularized standard of review. In fact, the court indicates that in the proper case
the "task of fashioning institution-wide standards of adequacy" may be undertaken
by the courts. Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 526 (5th Cir. 1974).
34. The appropriateness of relief via habeas corpus was mooted by Donaldson's
release prior to trial.
35. Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 526 (5th Cir. 1974).
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